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IMMIGRATION LAW BY PROXY: THE CASE OF COLORADO’S 
HUMAN SMUGGLING CRIME 
CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ† 
INTRODUCTION 
As the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly reiterated since 
the late nineteenth century, immigration law is an area of federal domi-
nance. The power “to forbid the entrance of foreigners . . . or to admit 
them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to 
prescribe[,]”1 the Court wrote in 1892, “is vested in the national govern-
ment.”2 More recently, the Court explained in 2012 that the federal gov-
ernment has “broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration.”3 
Despite the federal government’s expansive reach in immigration 
law, the states nonetheless retain authority that allows them to play an 
important role in migrants’ lives. Through their traditional powers to 
adopt criminal statutes and police their communities, states can indirect-
ly—but intentionally—inject themselves into the incidents of ordinary 
life as a migrant. In a number of ways, Colorado has done just that. One 
notable example is a criminal prohibition against human smuggling, a 
challenge to which is currently pending before the Colorado Supreme 
Court.4 This essay begins by addressing that statute’s reach. It then pro-
ceeds to discuss the statute’s treatment in the Colorado Court of Appeals 
and the challenges against it pending before the Colorado Supreme 
Court. The essay closes by placing the human smuggling provision with-
in a broader context in which states criminalize immigration-related ac-
tivity. 
I. STATE INVOLVEMENT IN HUMAN SMUGGLING CONTROL 
As a government of limited powers, the federal government’s broad 
reach in immigration law is rather exceptional. The norm, in contrast, is 
for the states to regulate most areas of law. Reflecting this, the states 
retain substantial authority to criminalize a broad range of undesirable 
conduct. In recent years, many states have used this general authority to 
  
 † Visiting professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. Publisher, crImmigra-
tion.com blog. Many thanks to Paul Warren for inviting me to contribute this essay. 
 1. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (alteration in original) (cita-
tion omitted). 
 2. Id.  
 3. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012). 
 4. Fuentes-Espinoza v. People, No. 13SC128, 2014 WL 1190061 (Colo. Mar. 24, 2014). 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602896 
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specifically target illicit movement of people within their boundaries.5 
These laws tend to take two forms: those that are frequently described as 
“trafficking” laws and those described as “smuggling” laws. The former 
prohibit transporting people for the purpose of introducing them into the 
sex trade, slavery, or involuntary servitude.6 The latter prohibit “the im-
portation of people into a country via the deliberate evasion of immigra-
tion laws.”7 
Colorado joined the state-level anti-human smuggling trend in 2006. 
The statute enacted that year, Colorado Revised Statute § 18-13-128, 
provides: “A person commits smuggling of humans if, for the purpose of 
assisting another person to enter, remain in, or travel through the United 
States or the state of Colorado in violation of immigration laws, he or she 
provides or agrees to provide transportation to that person in exchange 
for money or any other thing of value.”8 
The statute’s application effectively turns on a question of federal 
immigration law because it requires intent to assist someone who is pre-
sent in the United States in violation of immigration law. It is not, how-
ever, strictly a law about immigration in that it does not regulate the en-
try, exclusion, or forced removal of a particular person. Instead, it focus-
es the state’s resources on criminalizing a key piece of the migration 
process. Without someone to provide transportation services, most newly 
arrived migrants could not get very far physically or in meeting the ulti-
mate objectives many migrants share of earning a livelihood and reunit-
ing with family. They would largely be confined to the location where 
they find themselves at the moment where they are initially present in the 
United States in violation of federal immigration laws. For many mi-
grants this would mean the geographic location near the border where 
they entered clandestinely. For others, however, it would mean an inabil-
ity to move far from the location where they found themselves at the 
moment their temporary authorization expired or where they engaged in 
some conduct that put them in conflict with immigration laws. Obviously 
none of these are common or, in migrants’ eyes, suitable options. 
  
 5. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2319 (2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 446(A)-
(B) (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 787.07 (2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 577.675 (West 2008). 
 6. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, P.L. 106-386, § 102(a) (codified at 22 U.S.C. 
§ 7101(a)); see ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2319(F)(3) (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-13-128 (2006); 
see Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts to Stop 
Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977, 2981 (2006). 
 7. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement: Inves-
tigating Illegal Movement of People and Goods, Human Smuggling, http://www.ice.gov/human-
smuggling (last accessed Feb. 12, 2015); see Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 § 
274(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) (1986). 
 8. S.B. 06-206, 65th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (codified at COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 18-13-128). 
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II. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
Given its broad reach, it is not surprising that Colorado’s statute has 
met resistance in the state courts. Though there has only been one report-
ed prosecution applying § 18-13-128, the case threatens the statute’s 
viability. That case resulted from an incident in which Bernardino 
Fuentes-Espinoza was convicted of smuggling seven individuals. The 
facts are murky, but it appears that a man named Castels or Casteo hired 
Fuentes-Espinoza to drive his supposed family members from Phoenix to 
Kansas City.9 En route, Fuentes-Espinoza tried to pay for a replacement 
taillight with a $100 bill that Castels/Casteo provided and that turned out 
to be counterfeit. When a Wheat Ridge, Colorado police officer arrived, 
the officer arrested Fuentes-Espinoza on suspicion that the passengers 
were not authorized to be in the United States.10 Nothing in the record 
indicates why the police officer came to this conclusion and no evidence 
was provided about the immigration status of four of the seven passen-
gers.11 A Border Patrol officer testified that the other three passengers 
had the same or similar name as people he encountered near the Arizona-
México border on an earlier date—how much earlier is unclear.12 
In People v. Fuentes-Espinoza, the Colorado Court of Appeals up-
held Fuentes-Espinoza’s conviction in the face of a multi-pronged chal-
lenge.13 First, the court considered whether federal law preempts the state 
statute for two reasons: because federal law delegates jurisdiction over 
criminal immigration matters to federal courts and because it has prohib-
ited the states from regulating migrant smuggling. The former is called 
jurisdictional preemption and the latter is known as substantive preemp-
tion. Substantive preemption is itself usually subdivided into three parts: 
express preemption, implied field preemption, and implied conflict 
preemption, only the latter two being raised in Fuentes-Espinoza.14 Turn-
ing first to Fuentes-Espinoza’s jurisdictional preemption claim, the court 
concluded that federal law does not bar state courts from hearing “all 
matters touching on issues of immigration.”15 Having determined that the 
state courts retain jurisdiction to hear cases involving some types of im-
migration-related activity that the state legislature has criminalized, the 
court then turned to whether federal law has preempted the substantive 
provisions of the human smuggling statute. That is, does federal immi-
gration law preclude Colorado from enacting a human smuggling of-
fense? Instead of deciding this question on the merits, the court conclud-
  
 9. Opening Brief for Petitioner at 2, Fuentes-Espinoza v. People, 2014 WL 1190061 (Colo. 
2014) (No. 2013SC128). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 3. 
 12. Id. 
 13. People v. Fuentes-Espinoza, No. 08CA1231, 2013 WL 174439, at *1 (Colo. App. Jan. 17, 
2013). 
 14. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500–01 (2012). 
 15. Fuentes-Espinoza, 2013 WL 174439, at *3. 
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ed that Fuentes-Espinoza had waived this argument by failing to present 
it at the trial court.16 
Second, the Colorado Court of Appeals considered Fuentes-
Espinoza’s argument that a federal immigration law violation is an ele-
ment of the smuggling offense.17 The court rejected that argument. It 
concluded that this is not an element in part by emphasizing the statute’s 
focus on the defendant’s mental state. “[B]y including the actor’s pur-
pose as an element of the crime,” the court explained, “the statute em-
phasizes the actor’s intent, rather than the outcome of his or her ac-
tions.”18 
III. COLORADO SUPREME COURT CONSIDERATION 
At the time of this writing, Fuentes-Espinoza’s case is under review 
by the Colorado Supreme Court.19 In his brief to the Supreme Court, 
Fuentes-Espinoza has disputed each of the Court of Appeals’ conclu-
sions. Federal immigration law pervasively regulates migrant smuggling; 
thus, under the implied field preemption theory, Colorado cannot do so 
as well he argues.20 Moreover, he adds that the state statute conflicts with 
federal migrant smuggling laws by imposing a different sentencing 
scheme for virtually identical conduct, an argument under implied con-
flict preemption.21 Lastly, he claims that the statute requires that the 
prosecution prove that the people being smuggled were in fact present in 
the United States in violation of federal immigration law; a requirement 
that, if true, the prosecution clearly failed to meet.22 Several national 
nongovernmental organizations have jointly submitted an amicus brief in 
support of Fuentes-Espinoza, arguing that federal immigration law 
preempts Colorado’s statute.23 At the time of this writing, the govern-
ment had not yet submitted its merits brief so it was impossible to know 
how they planned to respond. Oral arguments are expected in the spring 
of 2015. 
Fuentes-Espinoza and the amici who have sided with him present 
compelling claims. There is no question that federal immigration law has 
long included an anti-smuggling provision. The current language prohib-
its transporting, moving, or attempting to transport any migrant any-
where in the country knowing or recklessly disregarding the fact that the 
  
 16. Id. at *4. 
 17. Id. at *1. 
 18. Id. at *5. 
 19. Fuentes-Espinoza v. People, No. 13SC128, 2014 WL 1190061 (Colo. March 24, 2014). 
 20. Opening Brief for Petitioner at 4, 13, Fuentes-Espinoza v. People, 2014 WL 1190061, 
(Colo. 2014) (No. 2013SC128). 
 21. Id. at 4, 16–17. 
 22. Id. at 29–30. 
 23. Amended Brief for National Immigration Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Fuentes-Espinoza v. People, (No. 13SC128), 2014 WL 1190061 (Colo. Mar. 24, 2014), 
available at http://crimmigration.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Fuentes-Espinoza-v-Colorado-
Amicus-NILC.pdf. 
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migrant is present in violation of law.24 Whether Colorado is barred from 
legislating in this area—implied field preemption—turns on whether the 
federal anti-smuggling statutory scheme is sufficiently “broad and com-
prehensive”,25 as the United States Supreme Court put it in a 1941 deci-
sion striking down a Pennsylvania requirement that migrants register 
with the state,26 that “the federal system will be assumed to preclude en-
forcement of state laws on the same subject.”27 The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit has recognized that the federal statute “ac-
counts for a broad range of circumstances that may result in an alien’s 
illegal presence in the United States.”28 This recognition certainly sup-
ports a conclusion that the federal government has occupied the field of 
migrant smuggling, but the Colorado Supreme Court will have to decide 
for itself whether it agrees. 
Meanwhile, Colorado’s statute is also at risk under the doctrine of 
implied conflict preemption. A state law is preempted under this doctrine 
if it impedes an important objective articulated by federal law.29 As re-
cently as 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that a conflict occurs 
when state law imposes a greater penalty than federal law for the same 
activity.30 An earlier U.S. Supreme Court case provides an even clearer 
assessment of implied conflict preemption: “States may not regulate ac-
tivity that [federal law] protects, prohibits, or arguably protects or pro-
hibits.”31 Colorado’s statute does just that. Under federal law, a single 
smuggling offense done for commercial advantage is punishable by up to 
ten years imprisonment or five years if not done for commercial ad-
vantage.32 In contrast, the Colorado smuggling offense can result in im-
prisonment for a minimum of four years and a maximum of twelve years, 
and no distinction is made between offenses involving commercial ex-
changes and those that do not.33 
In addition to these preemption concerns, the Colorado Supreme 
Court has agreed to consider whether the state law requires the prosecu-
tion to show that the smuggled individuals were present in the United 
States in violation of immigration law.34 Federal anti-smuggling law 
treats a violation of immigration law as an element of the offense that the 
  
 24. INA § 274(a)(ii). 
 25. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 69 (1941). 
 26. Id. at 59–60. 
 27. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 28. United States v. Franco-Lopez, 687 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 29. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012). 
 30. See id. at 2503 (quoting Wis. Dep’t of Indus, v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286 (1986)). 
 31. Wis. Dep’t of Indus. v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286 (1986). 
 32. INA § 247(b)(i)-(ii). 
 33. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A). 
 34. Fuentes-Espinoza v. People, No. 13SC128, 2014 WL 1190061 (Colo. March 24, 2014). 
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prosecution has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt,35 but the Colorado 
Court of Appeals held that the state version does not include a similar 
requirement.36 Simply acting with the purpose or desire to move a person 
in violation of immigration law is sufficient, the Court of Appeals held in 
Fuentes-Espinoza’s case.37 
Affirming the Court of Appeals’ conclusion would broaden the 
scope of Colorado’s human smuggling offense so far as to render the 
word “smuggling” devoid of its ordinary meaning. Without requiring the 
prosecution to show that a defendant actually moved people who were 
not authorized to be in the United States, it would be possible to convict 
individuals even when they moved people who were authorized to be in 
the United States—a United States citizen, for example, who had no idea 
he was a United States citizen.38 Indeed, there is no evidence that four of 
the seven individuals in the vehicle that Fuentes-Espinoza were in the 
United States without authorization and the evidence regarding the other 
three is tenuous at best. 
Rejecting the Court of Appeals’ conclusion is not much better. Do-
ing that would require police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges 
to engage in immigration law analyses that they are ill equipped to per-
form. If a violation of federal immigration law is deemed an element of 
Colorado’s human smuggling offense, then the law enforcement and 
judicial actors in the criminal justice system will be required to deter-
mine whether someone is actually violating immigration law. Police of-
ficers would need to take a potential immigration law violation into con-
sideration when gauging reasonable suspicion to temporarily stop or 
probable cause to arrest. Likewise, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and 
judges would have to parse the intricacies of federal immigration law to 
determine a smuggled individual’s status. Would they know that individ-
uals who entered the country without authorization then violated a term 
of immigration law are just as out of compliance with immigration law as 
those who crossed into the United States clandestinely? Would they un-
derstand that many people who enter clandestinely later obtain permis-
sion to live and work here indefinitely? The examples could continue, all 
leading into an abyss of immigration law for state criminal justice system 
actors if the Colorado Supreme Court concludes that an immigration law 
violation is an element of the state’s smuggling offense. 
  
 35. See United States v. Franco-Lopez, 687 F.3d 1222, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2012) (collecting 
cases from the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits); United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 438 
(5th Cir. 2005). 
 36. People v. Fuentes-Espinoza, No. 08CA1231, 2013 WL 174439, at *1, *4–5 (Colo. App. 
Jan. 17, 2013). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See generally United States v. Juarez, 672 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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IV. CRIMINALIZATION OF MIGRATION TRENDS 
Whatever the outcome of the Colorado Supreme Court’s considera-
tion of the state’s human smuggling criminal offense, it is clear that in 
adopting the statute the state legislature was following a well-worn effort 
by state governments to regulate immigration indirectly—but no less 
importantly—than does the federal government. Given the expansive 
powers that the Supreme Court has repeatedly found to rest with the fed-
eral government rather than the state governments in this realm, states 
interested in dissuading immigration activity have had to turn to their 
traditional criminal policing powers. Some states, for example, have en-
acted criminal offenses that punish using certain documents to falsely 
claim United States citizenship or to conceal one’s true immigration sta-
tus.39 Others have stripped state judges presiding over criminal matters 
from granting bail to unauthorized migrants, though the Ninth Circuit 
ultimately held that one state’s attempt to do this, Arizona’s, violated the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.40 
Colorado has not been immune to such maneuvers. Just two years 
after the state legislature added the human smuggling offense to the state 
penal code, the state witnessed a high profile immigration law enforce-
ment operation that relied heavily on traditional criminal policing pow-
ers. In 2008, the Weld County Sherriff’s Department seized roughly 
5,000 client files from a tax preparer in Greeley known to serve the local 
migrant community. A number of individuals whose files were taken and 
examined were subsequently prosecuted for identity theft41 and criminal 
impersonation.42 The Colorado Supreme Court eventually concluded that 
the prosecutions could not stand because police obtained the tax files in 
violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment.43 
The fact that many of these efforts have later been deemed unconsti-
tutional illustrates the legal perilousness with which sub-federal actors 
become involved in immigration law. On numerous occasions they have 
pushed the outer limits of state involvement in regulating immigration 
law only to later learn that they went too far. By then, however, lives 
have often been upturned. Colorado’s human smuggling offense may 
soon become the next example. 
  
 39. See OR. REV. STAT. § 165.800(1), (4)(b)(D); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-615(a). 
 40. See ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22(A)(4) (held unconstitutional by Lopez-Valenzuela v. Ar-
paio, 770 F.3d 772, 788 (9th Cir. 2014)); MO. ANN. STAT. § 544.470(2); see also UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 17-22-9.5(4) (creating rebuttable presumption that migrants are flight risks). 
 41. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5-902. 
 42. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5-113. 
 43. People v. Gutierrez, 222 P.3d 925, 940 (Colo. 2009). 
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CONCLUSION 
It is too soon to know what awaits Colorado’s human smuggling of-
fense. Whatever its fate, the statute stands as a testament to Colorado 
legislators’ attempt to alter migrants’ ability to come to or remain in the 
state. In this way, Colorado’s human smuggling statute is immigration 
law by proxy. 
  
 
